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PROLOGUE
CarolineJoan (Kay) S. Picart
Issue 23.3 of the Florida Journal of International Law brings
together an exciting variety of articles-ranging from issues of human
rights and laws of war,I to comparative international law in the areas of
contracts and family law-written by an accomplished group of
scholars. First, Daphn6 Richemond-Barak's 2 "Applicability and
Application of the Laws of War to Modem Conflicts," analyzes how
principles governing inter-state wars could be applied to conflicts
involving non-state actors, whether they are members of guerilla
groups, terrorist organizations, or even private military contractors.
Richemond-Barak's inquiry begins with the question of whether the
laws of war apply at all in "asymmetrical conflicts" because conflicts
revolving around non-state actors "challenge a fundamental assumption
of the laws of war: reciprocity, or the expectation that other parties to
the conflict will respect similar legal and behavioral norms."
Richemond-Barak takes the position that "most of international
humanitarian law is binding in most conflicts on most actors (whether
or not the parties behave reciprocally)." However, she notes one
exception: Richemond-Barak argues that the "only situation in which a
Caroline Joan (Kay) S. Picart is a J.D. Candidate (2012) at the University
of Florida
Levin College of Law, and the Editor-in-Chief of the FloridaJournal of International Law
(FIJL). Prior to law school, she was an Associate Professor of English and Humanities at
Florida State University with a Courtesy Appointment at Florida State University Law School.
She has an M.Phil. from Cambridge University (Sir Run Run Shaw Scholar and Wolfson Prize
Winner) and a Ph.D. from the Pennsylvania State University; she was a postdoctoral fellow at
Cornell University's School of Criticism & Theory. The author thanks Liridona Sinani and
Adam Suess for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts, and for their professionalism and
hard work as Articles Editors in the recruitment and selection of the articles in FJ1L Issue 23.3.
The author also thanks David Altman; Monica Haddad; Chelsea Koff, Student Works Editor;
and Fabienne Suter, Managing Editor, for their kind assistance in evaluating the write-on
competition and helping select the Best Case Comment. Finally, she owes a debt of gratitude to
Professor Berta Hemandez-Truyol, Faculty Advisor to FJIL, and Victoria A. Redd, Staff Editor,
as well as Fabienne Suter, Marlowe Fox, J.D. and Gerardo M. Rivera, J.D. for their helpful
comments on final proofs.
1. See generally Emmanuel Gross, The Laws of War Waged Between Democratic States
and Terrorist Organizations:Real or Illusive? 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 389 (2003); Johan D. van der
Vyer, Legal Ramificationsof the War in Gaza, 21 FLA. J. INT'L L. 403 (2009).
2. Daphn6 Richemond-Barak teaches at the Radzyner School of Law at the IDC,
Herzliya. She holds a Maitrise from Universit6 Panthdon-Assas (Paris II), a Diploma in Legal
Studies from Oxford University (Hertford College), an LL.M. from Yale Law School, and a
Ph.D. from Tel Aviv University. Prior to joining the IDC, she served as a clerk at the
International Court of Justice and worked as an attorney in the New York office of Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.
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state may not be bound by all of humanitarian law is when, in an
international armed conflict, an opposing nonstate party repeatedly
violates international humanitarian law." Nevertheless, RichemondBarak acknowledges that "even when the applicability of the laws of
war is established," the legitimacy of their applicability to actors "who
do not fit easily within the civilian/combatant divide" remains
problematic. Consequently, she argues for "a more expansive and
dynamic interpretation of the notion of 'combatant,"' which includes
religious, historical, and legal traditions. For Richemond-Barak, such a
"broader" understanding of what a "combatant" is "would clarify the
legal regime applicable to nonstate actors and enhance the protection of
civilian populations in modern conflicts."
Second, Alan Reed's 3 "The Rome I Regulation and Reapprochement
of Anglo-American Choice of Law in Contract: A Heralded Triumph of
Pragmatism Over Theory" aims to "provide a novel and distinctive
deconstruction of the modernising reforms contained in the Rome I
Regulation which became effective in English law from December 17,
2009." In brief, Reed notes that there is a "significant degree of
replication" in terms of "applicable law selection in contract on both
sides of the Atlantic." Thus, there is "a consensus in broad
methodological perspectives between the Second Restatement and new
Rome I Regulation in terms of the general specific presumptions that
are adopted to promulgate certainty, predictability and ease of
application" which serve to "protect legitimate party expectations."
These prescribed rules may be "supplanted" in limited situations to
enable "beneficial flexible displacement, to protect commercial
efficiency, locali[z]e the central gravity of a contract, and
consequentially prevent unfairness, inappropriate outcome resolution
and capricious injustice." Ultimately, Reed argues that "pragmatism has
prevailed over functional choice of law principles in contract" because
"party autonomy now reigns supreme and imputed choice is heavily
dependent on addressing the factual 'centre of gravity' of the contract."
Third, Robert Rains' 4 "A Prenup for Prince William and Kate?
England Inches Toward Twentieth Century Law of Antenuptial
Agreements; How Shall It Enter the Twenty-first?" begins with an
allusion to the extremely popular royal wedding between the newly
3. Alan Reed is currently Professor of Criminal and Private International Law at
Sunderland University and has previously lectured at Cambridge University and Leeds
University. He graduated from Trinity College, Cambridge University with a First Class
Honours Degree in Law (1988) and was awarded the Dr. Lancey Prize and Holland Scholarship
to facilitate study in the United States. Professor Reed completed an LLM (Comparative Law) at
the University of Virginia and also became a Solicitor of the High Court of England and Wales.
4. Robert Rains is Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Family Law Clinic at the
Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.
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married Duke and Duchess of Cambridge as the popular cultural
backdrop on the state of English law in relation to prenuptial
agreements, which, in Rains' view, is "uncertain." Legal scholars had
hoped that the relatively new U.K. Supreme Court would bring "clarity
and predictability to the law with its decision in the Radmacher case." 5
Indeed, the Radmacher decision, handed down in October 2010,
reversed prior precedent that pre-nuptial agreements are contrary to
public policy, but "left many basic issues for Parliament to address and
resolve." Rains' article aims to do the following:
(1) "provide
background information on the American law of prenuptial agreements
as it has evolved since the groundbreaking 1970 Florida Supreme Court
decision in Posner;"6 (2) "explain the English case law and statutory
law leading up to Radmacher;" (3) "examine the Radmacher case and
its limitations," and finally; (4) "provide suggestions for statutory
changes to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which could provide
greater certainty to marrying couples wishing to settle their financial
arrangements, as long as certain safeguards are scrupulously observed."
Finally, Jennifer Allen,7 awardee of the Florida Journal of
InternationalLaw's Best Case Comment in Fall 2011, writes a thoughtprovoking piece entitled: "ACLU v. United States Department of
Defense: Substantive Difference = Substantial Deference." Here, in a
case involving important domestic and international political issues,
FOIA requesters, the ACLU, sought to obtain records relating to the
Government's conduct underlying its stated policy and reported
triumphs in relation to the Global War on Terror. As Allen notes, "the
Government had previously trumpeted the importance of the capture of
the 14 'high value detainees' and intelligence subsequently gained from
them." Thus, Allen observes that the case marks "a further retreat from
the goals of FOIA, in that the [FOIA] Act was initially envisioned to
promote transparency in government." For Allen, the holding
demonstrates that the DC Circuit's jurisprudence regarding Government
invocations of its state secrets privilege strengthens the Government's
ability to shield information from public scrutiny under the
classification exemptions contained in the Act.8 Allen concludes with a
witty pun that explains her title: "Regarding compelled disclosure in the
face of a validly claimed FOIA exemption, the Government's assertion
5. Radmacher v. Radmacher, [2010] UKSC 42.
6. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
7. Jennifer Allen is a J.D. Candidate at the University of Florida Levin College of Law
and is expecting an M.A. in Development Practice in 2012 from the University of Florida. She
is also a Research Editor of the FloridaJournalofInternationalLaw.
8. For an article similarly critical of governmental non-disclosure in relation to torture
and terrorism, see generally Kate Kovarovic, Our "Jack Bauer" Culture: Eliminating the
Ticking Time Bomb Exception to Torture, 22 FLA. J. INT'L L. 251 (2010).
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of substantial differences in the information sought and that, which had
previously been released, resulted in substantial deference to the
Government's affidavit."
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